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Horizontal Stare Decisis
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit
BY EMERY G. LEE IT

I. INTRODUCTION

tare decisis has recently received a great deal of scholarly attention,
with historical studies,' attitudinal studies,2 rational choice studies,3
and even formal models4 addressing the subject. One aspect of the norm
that has received little empirical inquiry, however, is the influence of
horizontal stare decisis at the federal courts of appeals level. This Article
examines how the three-judge panels of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit have treated their own precedents. During the period
studied, panels of the Sixth Circuit tended to treat their own precedents
positively, following them in over eighty percent of the cases. Sixth Circuit
panels treated their own precedents negatively in less than twenty percent
of subsequent citations, and most ofthese were "distinguishing" treatments.
These findings suggest that circuit judges generally comply with horizontal

* Assistant Professor of Political Science and Law, Case Western Reserve
University. The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Frances Lee and
Steve Wasby. A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting
of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 2003. This
research was supported by the W.P. Jones Presidential Faculty Development Fund
at Case Western Reserve University.
' See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in HistoricalPerspective: From the
FoundingEra to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647 (1999).
2 See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR
MINORITY WILL (1999) [hereinafter SPAETH & SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE].
3 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)

[hereinafter EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, CHOICES].
4 See, e.g., Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative
Precedentand IntrajudicialCommunication,96 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 755 (2002);
Lewis A. Komhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-ConstrainedTeam: Hierarchy
and Precedentin a JudicialSystem, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1605 (1995).
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precedent at the courts of appeals level. The Article then tests several
hypotheses regarding factors that make negative treatment more likely.
Among other things, the ideological composition of the hearing panels does
not explain variation in the negative treatment of precedents when other
factors are controlled. The ideological composition of the hearing panels,
however, is important in explaining the ideological direction of the
decisions reached by the respective panels.
This examination of horizontal stare decisis on the courts of appeals
contributes to the study ofjudicial behavior in at least two respects. First,
it contributes to the debate over the influence of judicial norms such as
stare decisis on judicial behavior. Judicial scholars have focused on the
influence of stare decisis at the Supreme Court level, often asserting that
the norm should have a greater effect at the courts of appeals level.'
Judicial scholars have found that the courts of appeals generally do comply
with binding Supreme Court precedent when it exists; thus, the premise
holds true.' Similarly, J. Woodward Howard found that circuit judges
report high levels of compliance with binding precedent, including circuit

5

See, e.g.,

JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND

THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED

111 & n.80 (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL &

SPAETH, ATTrITUDINAL MODEL].
6

See generally James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principles:U.S. Court of

Appeals Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236 (1999)

(finding that the federal courts of appeals follows Supreme Court precedent by
comparing the number of free exercise claimants who prevailed prior to Smith with
those who prevailed after Smith); John Gruhl, The Supreme Court'sImpact on the
Law ofLibel: Compliance by Lower FederalCourts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502 (1980)

(finding that the lower federal courts followed Supreme Court precedent in the area
of libel law); Malia Reddick & Sara C. Benesch, Norm Violation by the Lower
Courts in the Treatmentof Supreme Court Precedent:A ResearchFramework,21
Donald R. Songer, The Impact of Supreme Court Trends
on Economic PolicyMaking in the UnitedStates Courts ofAppeals, 49 J. POL. 830

JUST. SYS. J. 117 (2000);

(1987) (finding that the courts of appeals followed Supreme Court precedent with
regard to economic policy-making); Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of
Justice: Testing the Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court

Interactions,38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994) (revealing a high degree of congruence and responsiveness by the courts of appeals to Supreme Court precedent with
regard to search and seizure decisions); Donald R. Songer & Reginald Sheehan,
Supreme CourtImpact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York
Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990) (finding

high rates of compliance by the courts of appeals with the Mirandaand New York
Times decisions).
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precedent. 7 This Article provides systematic evidence of circuit judge
compliance with horizontal precedents.
Second, this Article studies one ofthe twelve regional courts of appeals
rather than the United States courts of appeals considered as one court.
Political scientists have often noted that circuit judges tend to cite the
decisions of their own circuits8 and have noted the reason for their doing
so: the norm of horizontal stare decisis. 9 But these scholars have at times
failed to understand fully the mindset of circuit judges with respect to
circuit precedents. Each court of appeals is a separate court within the
federal judicial hierarchy, and the judges of each circuit think of their
courts in this way.'0 As a separate court, each circuit generates its own
precedents, made binding in subsequent cases according to circuit rules.
When considering what legal rules to apply to a case, circuit judges, and
their clerks, first ask whether there is binding Supreme Court precedent,
which of course would trump circuit precedent. Then, circuit judges ask
whether there is binding circuit precedent. In many, if not most, cases, the
precedents of other circuits will be surveyed only after the judge has
determined that his own circuit has not previously decided an issue. To
understand the behavior of circuit judges, one must understand the court of
appeals context, including the influence of circuit precedent on circuit
judge decision making.
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES
A.

The Supreme Court

Previous empirical studies of the norm of horizontal stare decisis have
focused on its influence at the Supreme Court level in the federal judicial

7

See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL

JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CIRCUITS 163-66 (1981).
I See id. at 165 (finding that thirty-four out of thirty-five judges reported that
it was at least moderately important to follow circuit precedent).
9 See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 54, 136-37, 144 (2002). Klein states, for example, that "judges tend to
cite rulings from their own circuit quite liberally-far more frequently than is
strictly necessary." Id. at 44. From the circuit judge's point of view, however, the
law of the circuit is the law. It is odd to find a scholar as sensitive to legal goals as
Klein criticizing judges for citing the law too frequently.
"oSee generally JONATHAN M. COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS 169-80
(2002).
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hierarchy. Brenner and Spaeth conducted the first comprehensive study of
the subject and concluded that the overruling decisions of the Supreme
Court were largely explained by the attitudinal model." Examining
individual Justices' votes in decisions that formally altered precedent, they
found that 97.6% of those votes (976 out of 1000 votes) were attitudinally
consistent. 2 This finding suggests that the norm of horizontal stare decisis
does not typically constrain the voting of Supreme Court Justices in
overruling decisions. Similarly, Segal and Spaeth concluded, in a subsequent study, that stare decisis rarely influences the decisions of Supreme
Court Justices. 3
Segal and Spaeth devised a clever research design to measure the
influence of stare decisis on justices' votes. First, they sampled Supreme
Court precedents that included dissenting opinions and identified the
"progeny" of these precedents. 4 They then examined these progeny to
determine whether Justices who had dissented in the precedent adhered to
the precedent in the progeny ("precedential" behavior) or continued to
dissent from the precedent ("preferential" behavior). 5 Over the entire
history of the Supreme Court, Segal and Spaeth found that only 11.9% of
the votes and opinions sampled fell into the precedential category, while
88.1% of the votes and opinions fell into the preferential category. 6 From
this, they concluded that "the justices are rarely influenced by stare
decisis."' 7 In a later study, these scholars have gone as far as to refer to "the
phony world of precedent and history."' 8
The findings of attitudinal studies on the influence of stare decisis on
Supreme Court Justices are not directly applicable to the courts of appeals.
As Segal and Spaeth themselves point out, Supreme Court Justices occupy
"See SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS (1995).

See id. at 70. In other words, justices' votes in overruling decisions were
consistent with measures of the justices' political ideology. Id.
'3 See SPAETH & SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE, supra note 2, at 288.
2

14 See id. at 23-33.

1 See id. at 33-40.
16 See id. at 287.
"7See id. at 288.
'8 See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 5, at 85. Segal and

Spaeth quoted a statement made by Judge Richard Posner in a 1999 New York
Times interview: "'There is a tremendous amount of sheer hypocrisy in judicial

opinion-writing. Judges have a terrible anxiety about being thought to base their
opinions on guesses, on their personal views. To allay that anxiety, they rely on the
apparatus of precedent and history, much of it is extremely phony.'" Id. (quoting
Linda Greenhouse, In His Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at A 13).
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a unique position in the federal judicial hierarchy.' 9 Without a higher court
to reverse their decisions, and without, generally speaking, ambitions for
higher office, Supreme Court Justices can "almost always ... vote their
sincere policy preferences in the decision on the merits.,, 20 Lower federal
court judges may fear reversal by a higher court and may harbor ambitions
for higher office; these factors limit the ability of such judges to pursue
their policy preferences in as sincere a manner. Studies of court of appeals
compliance with Supreme Court precedent suggest such a contention .2
With respect to circuit precedent, circuit judges may also fear reversal by
the en banc court if they deviate from binding circuit precedent. 2 Other
scholars have questioned whether the attitudinal model can successfully
explain lower court behavior.23
Furthermore, the norm of horizontal stare decisis is more strict at the
court of appeals level than at the Supreme Court level, at least in a formal
sense with respect to three-judge panels. Unlike the Supreme Court, which
is free to reexamine the soundness of its own precedents, a three-judge
hearing panel of a court of appeals is generally prohibited from overruling
the decision of another panel of the same circuit, let alone the en banc court
or the Supreme Court. 4 This is discussed further in the next section.
It also bears mentioning that a number of prominent scholars disagree
with the conclusions of the attitudinalists with respect to the influence of
stare decisis on Supreme Court decision making. Knight and Epstein, for
example, present a great deal of evidence that stare decisis constrains
policy-oriented Justices' pursuit of their policy preferences. 5 Most
importantly, these authors argue that a societal belief in the rule of law may
require Supreme Court Justices to follow precedent to preserve the
legitimacy of the judicial function, even in cases where the Justices
themselves disagree with the precedent in question. 6 In the same vein,
'9See id. at 19--30, 74-123.
20 SPAETH & SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE, supra note 2, at 18.
21See sources cited supra note 6.
22See 6TH CIR. R. 35(c) (stating
that rehearing en banc is appropriate

where "an

opinion directly conflicts with prior... [c]ircuit precedent").
23 See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS
190-91 (4th ed. 2001).
24 See discussion infra Part II.B.
25 See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of StareDecisis, 40 AM. J. POL.
Set. 1018, 1032 (1996); see also EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, CHOICES, supra note 3, at
163--77.
26
See Knight & Epstein, supra note 25, at 1022.
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circuit judges may be constrained in a similar way-perhaps not by public
opinion, as few decisions of the courts of appeals receive public attention,
but by elite opinion and professional reputation. A judge who deviates from
the norm may risk such informal sanctions from her colleagues."
B. The Courts of Appeals
Previous studies have noted the existence of the norm of horizontal
stare decisis at the court of appeals level but have not studied it systematically. 28 A number of studies, however, have addressed the issue of court of
appeals compliance with binding Supreme Court precedent. 29 These studies
have concluded that, although courts of appeals may from time to time
correctly anticipate the overruling of a Supreme Court precedent, 0 circuit
judges generally comply with existing Supreme Court precedent. 3'
Examining search and seizure decisions, Songer, Segal, and Cameron found
a high degree of congruence between Supreme Court policy directives and
court of appeals decisions as well as a high degree of responsiveness to
changing Supreme Court policy on the part of circuit judges.32 These
authors also found, however, that circuit judges still had "room to maneuver"3 3 in many cases and thus the ideology of circuit judges still mattered,
despite the binding nature of Supreme Court precedent.34 Other studies of

2 For other criticisms of an earlier

version of Segal and Spaeth's study, Jeffrey

A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of StareDecisis on the Votes of United
States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCi. 971 (1996) [hereinafter Segal
& Spaeth, Influence]; see Saul Brenner & Marc Stier, Retesting SegalandSpaeth's
Stare Decisis Model, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1036 (1996); Richard A. Brisbin, Jr.,
Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of Law in Supreme Court
DecisionMaking, 40 AM. J.POL. Sci. 1004 (1996); Donald R. Songer & Stefanie
A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices' Values on Supreme
CourtDecisionMaking,40 AM. J. POL. SC. 1049 (1996). Like Knight and Epstein,

supra note 25, these critics all argue that Segal and Spaeth give too little weight to
the norm of stare decisis at the Supreme Court level.
28 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 10, at 45-46.
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31 See Reddick & Benesch, supra note 6, at 124-27.

3'See id. at 135.
32

See Songer et al., supra note 6, at 684-85.

3 See id. at 693.
34 See id. at 692-93.

2003-2004]

HORIZONTAL STARE DECISIS

court of appeals decision making have found compliance with Supreme
Court precedent in free exercise, 35 obscenity, 36 and libel cases.37
In theory of course, the high degree of congruence between Supreme
Court policy and court of appeals decision making is consistent with
different, even contradictory explanations. Songer, Segal, and Cameron3"
as well as Brent39 apply principal-agent theory and thus rely on Supreme
Court monitoring of lower court decisions to explain this phenomenon.
Other judicial scholars have looked on this high degree of compliance as
the result of judges' internalization of norms, including stare decisis.4"
Howard concluded that "nearly all" the judges he interviewed "felt strongly
constrained by the norms of stare decisis."'
There can be little doubt that a norm of horizontal stare decisis exists
at the court of appeals level in the federal judicial hierarchy. As Judge Cole
of the Sixth Circuit observed in a recent (but ironically, since overruled)
case, "[i]t is axiomatic that a court of appeals must follow the precedent of
' In the Sixth Circuit this norm is
prior panels within its own circuit."42
embodied in circuit rule 206(c), which states in relevant part: "Reported
panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent
panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel."4' 3 This rule is also
stated in Salmi v. Secretary of Health & Human Services." Often cited for
this proposition, Salmi states: "A panel of this Court cannot overrule the
decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority
unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires
modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior
Brent, supra note 6.
See Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, IntegratingAlternativeApproaches to
the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36
AM. J. POL. SCI. 963 (1992).
31 See Gruhl, supra note 6; Songer & Sheehan, supra note 6.
38 See Songer et al., supra note 6.
39
See Brent, supra note 6.
4 See HOWARD, supra note 7, at 164.
41See id. Howard's study found that thirty-two out of thirty-five judges found
precedent "very important" in influencing their decisions, two judges considered
precedent
"moderately important" and one judge did not respond. See id.
42
See United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422,452 (6th Cir. 2002), overruled
by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2002), and cert. denied, 155
L. Ed. 2d 527.
31See
36

43 6TH CIR. R. 206(c).

44 See Salmi v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685 (6th Cir.
1985).
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decision."4 5 For three-judge hearing panels of the Sixth Circuit, prior panel
decisions are binding horizontal precedent.
There are, at the outset, reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of this
norm. For one thing, circuit judges can be observed from time to time citing
the norm of horizontal stare decisis in dissent. Judge Batchelder in
LeMarbe v. Wisneski, for example, quoted from an earlier dissenting
opinion authored by Judge Keith, "[i]t has been the policy of this circuit
that one panel cannot overrule the decision of another panel absent either
intervening Supreme Court authority to the contrary or other circumstances
' This defensive use of the rule
which render the precedent clearly wrong."46
to argue that the panel majority is illegitimately ignoring or undermining
circuit precedent suggests that the norm is not always closely observed.
Moreover, like their Supreme Court counterparts, circuit judges may
use various techniques to avoid or even undermine circuit precedents with
which they disagree. For example, circuit judges can distinguish precedents, even where the norm of horizontal stare decisis prevents them, as "a
matter of good form,"47 from explicitly overruling them.48 As noted above,
previous studies have suggested that compliance with precedent is not
inconsistent with the pursuit of policy preferences by circuit judges.49
In sum, there are reasons to believe that the norm of horizontal stare
decisis exerts a strong influence at the court of appeals level, but without
a more systematic effort to assess that influence, one is left only with
statements of the norm and anecdotal support for it. Similarly, Supreme
Court justices pay heed to the norm in their opinions; references to the
norm are not unusual." But the evidence for the efficacy of the norm is not

45

Id. at 689.

' See LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429, 442 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1267 n.6 (6th Cir. 1981)
(Keith, J., dissenting)).
47 SEGAL & SPAETH, ATITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 5, at 81.
" Id. at 81-83; see also Lawrence Baum, Lower Court Response to Supreme
Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208, 212
(1978) ("The capacity of lower-courtjudges to reconcile obedience to higher courts
with evasion of their commands through the device of distinguishing precedents is
well known to observers of the judiciary.").
49 See supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
50
See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III, OverrulingRhetoric: The Court'sNewApproach
to Stare Decisis in ConstitutionalCases, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 582 (2002).
(exploring the evolution of the" 'special justification' approach to stare decisis in
constitutional cases"); supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
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exactly overwhelming at the Supreme Court level.5 The remainder of this
Article attempts to measure compliance with the norm of horizontal stare
decisis at the court of appeals level in a systematic fashion.
111. RESEARCH DESIGN

Previous studies on the influence ofthe norm of horizontal stare decisis
at the Supreme Court level have argued that the norm has little influence
and that the overruling decisions of Supreme Court justices are explained
by judicial ideology.52 The research design employed by Segal and Spaeth
to study the influence of the norm of horizontal stare decisis on Supreme
Court decision making,53 however, is not practical in the court of appeals
context for at least two reasons. First, it is simply not practical to look at
how dissenters in the precedent voted in the "progeny" of that precedent
because dissent is more rare in the court of appeals than in the Supreme
Court.54 Moreover, the courts of appeals typically hear cases in three-judge
hearing panels rather than en banc, so every current judge does not sit on
every case that comes before the court." For these reasons, the number of
judges that dissented in a precedent sitting on the hearing panel deciding
a "progeny" case would be too small to permit systematic analysis. Another
research design must be employed to study horizontal stare decisis at the
court of appeals level.
Second, the dependent variable of interest in studies of the Supreme
Court overruling votes or decisions, or formally altering of precedent56 is
problematic at the court of appeals level, given the relative strictness of the
norm of horizontal stare decisisY Circuit judges rarely overrule their own
precedents in panel opinions; the conditions under which they may formally

"' See SPAETH & SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE, supra note 2 at 288; SEGAL &
SPAETH, ATT1DUTINAL MODEL, supra note 5 at 85.
52 See, e.g., BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 11.

53 See SPAETH & SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE, supra note 2, at 23-44 (describing

the research design). Segal and Spaeth's research design is also discussed supra
notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
54

DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED

STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

104-05 (2000) [hereinafter

SONGER ET AL, CONTINU-

rY].

" CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 23, at 23-24.
See, e.g., SPAETH & SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE, supra note 2, at 30-40;
BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 11.
51 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
56
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do so rarely occur.58 Intervening Supreme Court precedent may enable a
panel to note the abrogation of a precedent, as a panel of the Sixth Circuit
did, for example, in Goad v. Mitchell." Goad invalidated a heightened
pleading requirement' that another panel of the Sixth Circuit had imposed
on certain § 1983 plaintiffs in Veney v. Hogan." But even if circuit judges
cannot overrule panel decisions in most circumstances, they may be able to
avoid complying with precedents with which they disagree through
distinguishing them or other forms of negative treatment. Positive
treatment, on the other hand, may be taken to indicate that the citing
majority paid deference to the precedent, even if in the abstract the judges
on the panel would have preferred a different rule of law. Thus treatment,
either positive or negative, is the dependent variable employed in this
study.
A. Hypotheses
Many factors may affect a hearing panel's treatment of precedent in
subsequent citations. Given the findings of previous research, one such
factor is the political ideology of the citing panel, especially when
compared to the ideology of the cited panel.62 Thus, the first hypothesis to
be tested is that conservativepanels are more likely to treatprecedents
decided by liberalpanels negatively than precedentsdecided by conservativepanels, and vice versa. This hypothesis attempts to gauge the influence
of the norm when the policy preferences of the citing panel differ from the
policy preferences of the precedent panel. As Segal and Spaeth and others
have pointed out, precedent cannot be said to influence a decision where
the judges would have reached the same decision regardless of the
existence of the precedent.6" Although the present study does not include
a direct measure of the policy preferences of the citing panel with respect
to the issues in the precedent decision, the ideological composition of the
panel can serve as an indirect measure of policy preferences. All else being
equal, I expect that liberal panels will be more likely to disagree with
precedents decided by conservative panels than precedents decided by

58 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
" Goad v. Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2002).
60 See id. at 502-03.
61 Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 1995), overruledin partby
Goad,297
F.3d at 505.
62 Songer et al., supra note 6, at 692-93.
63 See Segal & Spaeth, Influence, supra note 27, at 976.
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liberal panels and that this will be reflected in the likelihood that such
panels will treat precedents negatively.
To isolate the impact of judicial ideology, however, it is necessary to
hold other factors constant. One such factor is the ideological direction of
the case outcome. It is expected that liberal panels will be more likely to
reach liberal case outcomes than conservative panels, and vice versa. But
conservative panels will reach liberal case outcomes and liberal panels will
reach conservative case outcomes, and this may affect the subsequent
treatment of precedents. In reaching a liberal outcome in a subsequent case,
for example, a conservative panel might distinguish a conservative
precedent based on the facts of the citing case. Such an instance of negative
treatment would be accounted for by the direction of the subsequent case
outcome rather than the ideology of the panel. Thus, the second hypothesis
to be tested is that a precedent is more likely to receive negative treatment
when the citing panel reaches a different case outcome (ideological
direction) than the precedentpanel.
One must also consider whether the panels involved actually exercised
discretion in deciding the cases. The literature on the courts of appeals
makes clear that the majority of cases decided at the courts of appeals level
are "'easy' cases in which the legal texts are determinative so that judges,
regardless of their personal preferences, will mechanically apply the law."'
If the decision in the precedent involved the mere "mechanical" 65 application of' law to facts, then it is likely that the citing cases also present similar
"easy" decisions. The presence of judicial disagreement on the panel
deciding the precedent, on the other hand, provides evidence that the
precedent case presented the court with "reasonable decisional alternatives."67 Subsequent panels may be more likely to disagree with precedents
representing the actual exercise of judicial policy-making discretion than
those representing mechanical application of the law. Alternately, drawing
an analogy to studies of Supreme Court opinions, unanimously decided
precedents may be viewed as more "robust" than those decided by divided
panels.68 Thus, the third hypothesis to be tested is thatprecedents in which

64 SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY,

65

Id.

supra note 54, at 104.

66 Id.
67 DonaldR. Songer, Consensualand NonconsensualDecisionsin Unanimous
Opinionsof the United States Courts ofAppeals, 26 AM. J. POL. 225, 225 (1982).
68 See James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, The U.S. Supreme Court's
Incorporationand Interpretationof Precedent,36 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 139, 144
(2002).
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one judge writes separately (i.e., a concurrence or a dissent) are more
likely to receive negative treatment than precedents without a separate
writing.
Another possible indication of judicial discretion in a given case is
whether the panel designates its opinion for publication or relegates it to
unpublished status. Under circuit rules, only published opinions create
binding precedents for subsequent cases. 9 Thus, it is not possible to look
at the treatment of unpublished precedents, as there is no such thing, but
publication can be treated as an indication of some level of judicial
discretion in the citing case. Sixth Circuit rule 206(a) specifies various
criteria for determining when panel opinions should be published, including
"whether it establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing
rule of law, or applies an established rule to a novel fact situation."70 It is
likely that the establishment of a new rule or the modification of an existing
rule involves, to some extent, the exercise ofjudicial discretion. As a result,
it is likely that publication of the citing case will be correlated with
negative treatment. Thus, the fourth hypothesis tested is that published
opinions are more likely to treat a precedent negatively than unpublished
opinions.
Intervening events and the passage of time may also affect how
subsequent panels treat circuit precedents. For example, if a precedent has
previously received support from other panels, then subsequent citing
panels may pay it more deference.7" Positive citations to a particular
precedent might shore up its legitimacy and signal to other judges that
deviation from it would be disfavored. Thus, the fifth hypothesis to be
tested is that the morepriorpositive citationsto aprecedent, the less likely
it is that it will be treatednegatively.
Similarly, if a precedent has been undermined by prior negative
treatments, panels may be less inclined to follow it. Such negative
treatments might undermine the legitimacy of the precedent and signal to
other judges that deviation from it would find favor, at least with certain
other members of the court. This would be especially true in cases where
a panel called a precedent into doubt or questioned whether it was still
good law. Thus, the sixth hypothesis to be tested is that precedents that
69 See,

e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1; 6Th CIR. R. 206(a); 8TH CIR. R. 4.
6TH CIR. R. 206(a).
71Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 68, at 144, 151, 154 (analyzing the correlation between positive treatment of Supreme Court cases and subsequent positive
interpretation of the precedent).
70 See
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have received negative treatment in a prior decision are more likely to
receive negative treatment in a subsequent decision.
The mere age of a precedent may also affect how it is treated by
subsequent panels of the circuit, although it is not necessarily clear in the
abstract whether increased age would make it more or less likely that the
precedent would receive negative treatment. The age of a precedent,
however, can be treated as a proxy for the changing composition of the
court of appeals. As different judges sit on hearing panels, it becomes more
likely that the precedents decided by previous judges will be treated
negatively as new judges "make their mark" on the circuit, so to speak.
Thus, I hypothesize that older precedents are more likely to receive
negative treatment than relatively newerprecedents.
B. Data Collection and Coding
To test these hypotheses, a sample of Sixth Circuit citations of circuit
precedent was collected in the following way. Sixth Circuit precedents
decided in 1995 and 1996 were identified from the Federal Reporter.72
Landes and Posner found that the average "half-life" of a non-Supreme
Court precedent was 4.3 years, meaning that half of the citations to lower
federal court precedents in their study occurred within 4.3 years of the
precedents' decision date.73 Sampling precedents from eight and nine years
ago, then, guarantees that most of the citations of the precedents that will
occur are included in the sample. For each potential precedent, information
was collected on the case number, the authoring judge, panel membership,
whether there was a separate writing (concurrence or dissent), case
outcome (ideological direction), and decision date. Precedents involving
criminal procedure issues, including sentencing and civil rights claims
based on race or sex discrimination or the violation of federally guaranteed
rights7 4 were selected because these issue areas (1) make up a significant
part of the Sixth Circuit's docket and (2) allow for coding in terms of the
ideological direction of case outcome.
In the criminal procedure area, the case outcome variable was coded
"liberal" when relief, even partial relief, was granted to the defendant on
sampled precedents were contained in volumes 50-102 of the Federal
Reporter, 3d Series.
" See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, LegalPrecedent:A Theoretical
and EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 255 (1976).
14 In other words, civil rights cases were sampled when they involved either
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The latter category
includes several important cases on the issue of qualified immunity.
72 The
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the relevant issue and "conservative" when relief was denied. In the civil
rights cases, the case outcome variable was coded "liberal" when the panel
held in the plaintiffs' favor on the relevant issue and "conservative" when
the panel held in the defendants' favor. The panel membership variables
were coded to account for the party of the appointing president of both the
authoring judge and the other judges on the precedent panel. Although this
measure of appellate judge ideology has its limitations, previous studies
have shown "that the party affiliation appears to account for a substantial
portion of the variation in judicial voting."75 Using this measure, a liberal
panel is one on which a majority of the judges was appointed by a
Democratic president, and a conservative panel is one on which a majority
of judges was appointed by a Republican president.
Subsequent citations to these precedents in panel opinions were then
obtained through the use of Westlaw's Keycite service. Subsequent
citations were included in the sample if the treatment of the precedent was
negative, including "distinguished," or ifthe treatment was positive and the
citing case either "explained" or "discussed" the precedent. Subsequent
cases that merely cited the precedent without discussion, as in a string
citation, were omitted from the sample of citing cases. The positive
citations included in the sample generally represent more than a sentence
of discussion of the cited precedent; and, in many cases, the citing case
discusses the cited precedent at great length.76 Unpublished opinions,
including per curiam opinions, were included in the sample of citing
cases.

77

The following information was collected on the citing cases: case
citation, the treatment of the precedent, whether the citing case was
published, party of the president appointing the judges on the panel, case
outcome (ideological direction), decision date, the number of months
between decision in the citing case and decision in the precedent, and the
75See SONGER, CONTINUITY, supra note 54, at 118; see also CARP & STIDHAM,
supranote 23, at 97-107; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts of
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998).
76Keycite
indicates the depth of a precedent's treatment in a subsequent citation
with the following categories: explained (more than a page of discussion of the
precedent); discussed (less than a page, but more than a sentence of discussion);
cited (a sentence of discussion); and mentioned (usually a citation in a string
citation). Only the first two depths of treatment were included in the sample.
" Subsequent opinions designated unpublished "orders" were excluded from
the sample, however. Such orders are typically found in extremely easy cases, often
involving pro se prisoner appeals.

2003-2004]

HORIZONTAL STARE DECISIS

number of times the cited precedent had previously received negative and
positive treatment in published Sixth Circuit opinions. The variables for
panel membership and case outcome were coded in the same way as the
corresponding variables for the precedent cases."8 In multiple issue cases,
case outcome was coded to represent the case outcome on the issue or
issues for which the precedent was cited. The variables accounting for
previous treatments of the precedent case were coded using only other
published cases in the sample because only such citations carry precedential weight. In other words, each time a precedent case was treated
negatively by the Sixth Circuit in a published opinion, prior to decision in
the citing case, the variable for number of prior negative treatments was
increased by one; and each time a precedent case was treated positively in
a published opinion and either explained or discussed, the variable for
number of prior positive treatments was increased by one. Moreover, these
variables were coded only to reflect intervening citations on the issue being
determined in the citing case and not simply the number of times the
precedent was cited for any reason.
Once the data were collected, additional variables were computed
comparing the ideological direction of the precedent and citing case (Same
Direction) and the ideological composition of the majorities on the
precedent and citing panels (Same Majority). Because the unit of analysis
is the citation of precedent rather than the case, subsequent cases represent
more than one case in the sample if they cited more than one of the
precedents selected in the sampling procedure. Few citing cases are
included in the sample more than once, however; there are 422 distinct
citing cases in the sample, accounting for 499 observations, or citations to
precedent.
III. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Circuit judges rarely treat their own precedents negatively, and even
when they do so, they are much more likely to distinguish precedents based
on factual differences ("distinguishing treatment") than to engage in other,
"harsher" forms of negative treatment, such as limiting a precedent to its
facts or calling it into doubt. As shown in Table 1, negative treatment
occurred in only 18.8% of the cases in the sample (94 cases out of 499),
with distinguishing treatment accounting for 77.7% of the observed
instances of negative treatment (73 cases out of 94). The twenty-one other
cases of negative treatment include subsequent cases limiting precedents,
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See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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calling them into doubt, recognizing their abrogation based on intervening
legal developments, and even one instance where a panel declined to follow
a precedent.
Table 1: Incidence of Negative Treatment in Sample of Sixth Circuit Citations
of Its Own Precedents.

All Negative
Distinguishing
Other Negative

All Positive
Discussing
Explaining

Total

N

%

94

18.8

73
21

14.6
4.2

405

81.2

338
67

67.7
13.4

499

100.0

The data summarized in Table 1 indicate that circuit judges generally
treat their own precedents positively. Indeed, eight times out of ten they
followed the precedents cited, and this figure would be much higher if the
sample included citations to precedent without discussion. Thus, it is safe
to say that the overwhelming majority of panel citations to circuit precedent
are positive. It is possible, of course, that the judges of the Sixth Circuit
choose not to cite precedents with which they disagree and that this
explains, at least in part, the observed tendency toward positive treatment.
Whether the panel opinions actually cited the relevant binding precedents
is not part of this analysis. The majority of the citing panels in the sample
(70.8%), however, comprised of two judges appointed by a president of one
party and one judge appointed by a president of the other party. The
presence of potential "whistleblowing" judges on most of the panels
suggests that efforts to evade disfavored precedents by failing to cite them
would have only limited success."

'9 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 75. Cross and Tiller concluded that "[t]he
minority member acts as a whistle blower, ready to expose any cheating by the
majority." See id. at 2175. It is also possible that there are contrary precedents in
many areas of the law allowing circuit judges to choose to cite only precedents with
which they agree. I am unaware of any systematic support for the existence of such
contrary precedents, in general. See also Stephen L. Wasby, Inconsistency in the

2003-2004]

HORIZONTAL STARE DECISIS

Table 1 may be taken to suggest that circuit judges enjoy little
discretion in about eighty percent of the issues that they decide because of
the existence of binding circuit precedent. This would be an overly hasty
conclusion, however, because in certain cases a panel may "follow" a
precedent by extending its reach."0 Positive treatment alone cannot be taken
as evidence that the panel decision in a citing case was mechanical.
Moreover, negative treatment alone does not mean that a panel of the
court exercised policy-making discretion. If, for example, the relevant
statute or Sentencing Guidelines provision has been amended since a
precedent was decided, a citing panel may have no choice but to treat a
precedent negatively, regardless of its collective policy preferences. The
same is true of intervening Supreme Court precedent or circuit (en banc)
precedent. Of the twenty-one negative treatments that are not "distinguishing" treatments in the sample, at least four can be explained by reference
to such intervening legal developments beyond the court of appeals itself,"8
and at least one more can be explained by reference to a decision of the en
banc court.8 2 In other words, even negative treatment at the court of appeals
level may be the result of compliance with the norm of stare decisis.

United States Courts ofAppeals: Dimensions andMechanismsfor Resolution, 32
VAND. L. REV. 1343-73 (1979) (alleging that intracircuit inconsistency is a
problem in the Ninth Circuit). But see Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and
Jurisprudence:The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate
Court, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989) (finding that "intracircuit inconsistency"

in the Ninth Circuit was less common than sometimes thought, but that "precedents
pointing in different directions" were not unusual).
80 For example, a panel of the Sixth Circuit "followed" the Supreme Court
precedent Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), by extending the rule of
Apprendi to mandatory minimum discussion of this line of cases in the Sixth
Circuit. See Emery G. Lee, Policy Windows on the US. Courts of Appeals, 24
JUST. Sys. J. 307, 321-24 (2003).
S See United States v. Alexander, 59 F.3d 36 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing amendment
to relevant Sentencing Guidelines provision); Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917 (6th
Cir. 1996), abrogationrecognizedby Goad v. Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497,503 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)); United States v.
Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogation recognized by United
States v. Nance, No. 00-6444, 2002 WL 1359325, at *5 n.6 (6th Cir. June 20,
2002) (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)); Schilling v.
White, 58 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir. 1995), called into doubt by Shamaeizadeh v.
Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391,396 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.
1 (1998)).
82
United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372 (6th Cir. 1996), limitationrecognized

by United States v. Leaster, 2002 WL 1147343, at *7 n.3 (6th Cir. May 28, 2002)
(citing United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

[VOL. 92

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

The distinguishing treatments may actually represent genuine policymaking discretion, in that the finding of dispositive factual differences
between a subsequent case and the relevant precedent may be influenced
by the subsequent panel's policy preferences. A liberal panel, for example,
may be more likely to find that factual differences between a citing case
and a cited case justify a prodefendant result, and a conservative panel may
be more likely to find that such factual differences justify a progovemment
result. To test this conjecture and the other hypotheses described above,
logistic regression analysis was performed with treatment, either positive
or negative, as the dependent variable.83 Prior to examining the results of
the logistic regression, however, it may be helpful to examine bivariate
relationships between treatment and some of the independent variables
included in the logistic regression model. Table 2 presents the results of
various crosstabulations of treatment with selected independent variables
and controls.
Table 2: Percentage of Cited Cases in Sample Receiving Negative Treatment,
by Selected Explanatory Variables.
Category
Overall
By Citing Case Majority Ideology
Same as Cited Case Majority
Different than Cited Case Majority
Conservative Precedent Majority
Liberal Majority
Conservative Majority
LiberalPrecedentMajority
Liberal Majority
Conservative Majority
Conservative Precedent Direction
Liberal Majority
Conservative Majority
Liberal Precedent Direction
Liberal Majority
Conservative Majority

% Negative

N

18.8

499

18.7
18.9

235
264

18.7
16.8

150
107

20.3
19.3

128
114

20.0
10.2*

137
175

18.4
31.0*

103
84

" Because the dependent variable --treatment- is dichotomous (it can take only
two values: zero or one) linear regression is inappropriate. See generallyJOHN H.
ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT, AND PROBIT
MODELS Ch. 3 (1984).
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Category
By Citing Case Direction
Same Direction
Opposite Direction
Conservative Precedent Direction
Liberal Direction
Conservative Direction
Liberal Precedent Direction
Liberal Direction
Conservative Direction
Conservative Precedent Majority
Liberal Direction
Conservative Direction
Liberal Precedent Majority
Liberal Direction
Conservative Direction
By Publication
Published
Unpublished
By Separate Writing
Cited Case Includes
Cited Case Does Not Include

% Negative

N

9.2
33.7***

303
196

36.0
9.3***

75
237

9.1
32.2***

66
121

25.3
14.6*

79
178

21.0
19.4

62
180

24.8
12.2***

262
237

17.6
19.0

51
448

Percentage differences are not statistically significant unless otherwise noted.
***p< .001
** p<. 0 1
p < .05
The data summarized in Table 2 indicate that differences in the
ideology of the citing and precedent panels alone do not explain the
observed variation in negative treatment. Negative treatment was observed
in 18.9% of the cases in which a majority of the citing panel was of a
different ideological persuasion than a majority of the precedent panel, and
in 18.7% of cases in which the two panels had the same ideological
majority. Breaking the composition of the panel out into conservative and
liberal precedent majorities does not yield a different result. Liberal citing
majorities treat precedents decided by conservative majorities negatively
in 18.7% of cases, and conservative citing majorities treat precedents
decided by conservative majorities negatively in 16.8% of cases.
Conservative citing majorities treat precedents decided by liberal majorities
negatively in 19.3% of cases, and liberal citing majorities treat precedents
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decided by liberal majorities negatively in 20.3% of cases. None of these
rates of negative treatment is substantively different from the overall rate
of negative treatment, 18.8%.
Interestingly, a statistically significant difference in terms of negative
treatment is observed when one looks at the composition of the citing panel
majority and the ideological direction of the precedent. Liberal panels
treated conservative-direction precedents negatively 20.0% of the time,
while conservative panels treated conservative-direction precedents
negatively only 10.2% of the time. Conservative panels treated liberaldirection precedents negatively 31.0% of the time, compared to only 18.4%
for liberal panels. In other words, even if liberal citing panels are not more
likely than conservative citing panels to treat precedents decided by
conservative panels negatively, liberal panels are more likely than
conservative panels to treat precedents decided in a conservative direction
negatively, and the same is true of conservative panels and precedents
decided in a liberal direction.
This relationship between the ideological direction of the precedent and
the ideological direction of the subsequent case is even stronger when
considering the direction of the case outcome alone. Panels deciding the
issue in the citing case in the opposite ideological direction from the
direction of the precedent treated the precedent negatively 33.7% of the
time, while panels deciding the issue in the citing case in the same
ideological direction treated the precedent negatively only 9.2% of the
time. The same relationship holds when considering precedents decided in
a conservative and liberal direction only. Thus, panels deciding issues in
citing cases in a liberal direction treated conservative precedents negatively
32.2% of the time, and panels deciding issues in citing cases in a
conservative direction treated liberal precedents negatively 36.0% of the
time.
The ideology of the judges on the precedent panel was only correlated
with negative treatment, however, when the citing case was decided in a
liberal direction and the precedent was decided by a conservative majority.
These findings indicate that the ideological composition of panels explains
some variation in the treatment dependent variable, but that the relationship
between ideology and negative treatment is conditioned by the ideological
direction of the decisions involved. The interplay between these variables
is discussed further below."
Table 2 also indicates that the subsequent panel's decision to publish
was correlated with negative treatment. This makes sense given that

See infra pp. 789-91.
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publication is reserved for substantively important cases under circuit rules,
and judges are more likely to determine that a case distinguishing or
undermining a precedent is substantively more important than one merely
following precedent. 5 Given these rules, however, it is surprising that so
many negative treatments go unpublished (29 cases out of 94, or 30.9%).
Table 2 also indicates that the presence of a separate writing in the
precedent did not affect whether the precedent was treated negatively.
The results of the logistic regression, with treatment as the dependent
variable, are similar to the results presented in Table 2. The expected signs
for the variables in the regression are as follows: Same Majority, positive;
Same Direction, positive; Separate Writing, negative; Published, negative;
Negative Citations, negative; Positive Citations, positive; and Months
Elapsed, negative. Table 3 presents the regression results. The coefficient
for Same Majority is not statistically significant, and the sign is negative
rather than positive, the opposite of the expected direction. 6 From this, one
might conclude that the composition of the citing and precedent panels did
not affect the nature of the treatment received by the precedent, all else
being equal. The coefficient for Same Direction, however, is statistically
significant, and the sign is in the expected direction. As seen in Table 2, the
effects of the ideological composition of the panels involved are
conditioned on the ideological direction of the holdings in the cases.
Table 3: Logistic Regression Results, Treatment as Dependent Variable.
Variable
Constant
Same Majority
Same Direction
Separate Writing
Published
Negative Citations

B
1.751 ***
(.367)
-.182
(.251)
1.601***
(.261)
.057
(.422)
-.762**
(.265)
-.129
(.222)

Exp(B)
5.761
.834
4.960
1.059
.467
.879

e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text.
be noted that the results do not differ in any meaningful way if the
comparison is between the ideology of the judge authoring the citing opinion and
the ideology of the judge authoring the precedent.
85 See,

86 It should

[VOL. 92

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Variable
Positive Citations
Months Elapsed

B

Exp(B)

.205*
(.096)
-.016**
(.005)

1.227
.984

Standard errors in parentheses
Observations 499
Model x2=68.349***
-2 Log likelihood=414.543

Reduction in error=6.4%
***p< .001
**p<. 0 1
*p < .05
The other hypotheses described above87 find support in Table 3, with
two exceptions. As in Table 2, publication is negatively correlated with
treatment, even when the other variables are controlled. All else being
equal, a published opinion is more likely to treat the cited precedent
negatively than an unpublished opinion. As stated above, this reflects
compliance with the circuit rule regarding publication. 8 The coefficients
for previous positive citations and the age of the precedent, as measured by
the number of months elapsing between the precedent decision and the
citing decision, are both statistically significant and take the expected signs.
All else being equal, then, intervening positive citations make it more likely
that a precedent will be cited positively in a subsequent case, and the older
the precedent, the more likely it is to receive negative treatment. Previous
negative treatments of the precedent, on the other hand, do not appear to
influence subsequent treatment in a systematic fashion. This makes sense,
given that the overwhelming majority of negative treatments in the sample
are distinguishing treatments. The fact that a prior panel distinguished a
precedent factually does not necessarily undermine the precedent's
applicability under different fact patterns. Similarly, the finding with
respect to the age of the precedent can be stated in the following way: the
longer a precedent exists, the greater the chance that it will be
distinguished, all else being equal. Finally, the presence of a separate
writing in the precedent did not make negative treatment more likely.

87
88

See supra Part III.A.
6TH CIR. R. 206(a); see also supra text accompanying note 85.
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To further analyze the effects of the independent variables included in
the logistic regression model, the predicted probabilities of negative
treatment for various values of the independent variables were calculated.8 9
Setting the categorical independent variables Same Majority, Separate
Writing, Negative Citations, and Positive Citations at their modal value
(zero) and the value of Months Elapsed at the sample median, thirty-seven
months, the predicted probability of negative treatment where the citing
panel reaches a conclusion in the direction opposite the precedent direction
is .402 in a published opinion and .239 in an unpublished opinion. The
predicted probability of negative treatment of a cited precedent where the
citing panel reaches a conclusion in the same direction is .119 in a
published opinion and only .06 in an unpublished opinion. Changing the
values so that the precedent has one prior positive citation and doubling the
median value on Months Elapsed to seventy-four, the predicted probability
of negative treatment where the citing panel reaches a conclusion in the
direction opposite the precedent direction increases to .497 in a published
opinion and .316 in an unpublished opinion. The predicted probability of
negative treatment where the citing panel reaches a conclusion in the same
direction, under the same circumstances, is. 166 in a published opinion and
only .085 in an unpublished opinion.
The most striking aspect of Tables 2 and 3 is the weak direct
relationship between the ideology of the panel majorities and the incidence
of negative treatment. One would expect, all else being equal, that
conservative panels would treat precedents decided by liberal panels
negatively, and vice versa, but that does not appear to be the case.
This does not mean, however, that the ideology of the panel majorities
does not affect the direction of the case outcomes involved. Instead, the
ideology of the citing case panel majority is positively correlated with the
direction of the citing case on the relevant issue = . 112,p < .05), and the
ideology of the precedent case panel majority is positively correlated with
the direction of the precedent ® = .127, p < .01). Liberal panel majorities
reached liberal results in 32.7% of the citing cases and 43.8% of the
precedents, as opposed to conservative panel majorities, which reached
liberal results in only 22.6% and 31.5%, respectively. From this, building
on Table 2, it is clear that liberal citing panels are more likely to treat
precedents decided in a conservative direction negatively and that these
conservative-direction precedents were more likely to have been decided
8

9 See TIM FUTING LIAO, INTERPRETING LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS 16-18

(1994) (explaining how to calculate predicted probabilities of the dependent
variable for given values of the independent variables).
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by conservative panels. The same holds for conservative citing panels and
liberal-direction precedents. Indeed, of the conservative-direction
precedents included in the sample, 56.4% were decided by conservative
panels (176 out of 312), and almost the same proportion of the liberaldirection precedents were decided by liberal panels, 56.7% (106 out of
187). In sum, the ideological composition of the panels involved is
important because of its consequences for the direction of the precedent;
however, the ideological composition of the panels, alone, does not explain
variation in the negative treatment of precedents.
The lower liberalism figures for citing cases compared to precedents
described in the previous paragraph reflect the inclusion of unpublished
cases in the sample of citing cases. Unpublished cases often, but not
always, involve routine appeals, especially direct criminal appeals, that are
often without merit.9" The conservative (progovemment) decisions in these
cases thus decrease the observed level of liberalism in the sample. To
further examine this, I aggregated the data to the discrete case number and
looked at panel decisions with respect to publication of opinions instead of
citations. I found that publication is positively correlated with direction ®
= .240, p < .001). This means that a liberal outcome makes publication
" Judge Posner, for example, discusses how "the greatly expanded availability
of lawyers for indigent claimants, especially... indigent criminal defendants" has
resulted in an increased rate of appeals since 1960, and how the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 "greatly expanded the appealability of federal sentences." See
RICHARD

A.

POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM

96-97

(1996). Thus, "[g]iven a free lawyer, the cost of appealing drops to zero, and the
defendant will have no reason not to appeal even if the chances of winning are
slight-as they are." Id. at 118. In a similar vein, Wasby notes that "direct criminal
appeals" are more likely to involve "'simple' issues and thus are less likely to be
published than cases involving more complex issues. See Stephen L. Wasby,
UnpublishedDecisions in the FederalCourts ofAppeals: Making the Decision to
Publish, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROC. 325, 338 (2001). I do not mean to suggest that

all unpublished cases (or criminal appeals) are routine and/or frivolous. See Donald
R. Songer, Criteriafor Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
FormalRules Versus EmpiricalReality, 73 JUDICATURE 307-13 (1990).

[T]he official criteria for publication do not provide an adequate description
of the differences in practice between decisions which are published and
those which are not. A significant number of the unpublished decisions of
the courts of appeals appear to involve cases which are non-routine,
sometimes politically significant, and which are nonconsensual appeals
which present the judges on the panel hearing the appeal with an opportunity to exercise substantial discretion in their decision-making.
Id. at 313.
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more likely, and that both liberal panels (which publish 76.7% of liberal
decisions) and conservative panels (60.0%) are more likely to publish
liberal decisions than conservative decisions (44.7% and 43.4%,
respectively).
The most likely reason for this, again, is adherence to circuit rules
regarding publication. Sixth Circuit rule 206(a)(5) identifies "whether it
reverses the decision below" as a factor for consideration in determining
whether an opinion should be published in the Federal Reporter.91 In
criminal cases, a prodefendant, liberal decision typically involves the
reversal of a lower court decision, and thus one would expect more liberal
decisions among published cases. Even conservative panels are more likely
to publish cases decided in a liberal direction than those decided in a
conservative direction. This finding suggests that circuit norms and rules
reflecting legal values, such as the rules with respect to publication and
precedent, influence the decision making of circuit judges, even where
those norms cut against their policy preferences.
IV. CONCLUSION

Negative treatment of Sixth Circuit precedent occurred in less than
twenty percent of subsequent citations. The overwhelming majority of these
negative treatments were distinguishing treatments rather than potentially
"harsher" forms of negative treatment. Panels of the Sixth Circuit rarely
applied such harsh forms of negative treatment to their own precedents and
generally follow the precedents that they cite in their opinions. These
findings provide some support for the view that the norm of horizontal stare
decisis constrains decision making on the Sixth Circuit. 92 A number of
factors made negative treatment more likely, all else being equal. The most
significant of these was that a citing panel reaching a conclusion in the
opposite ideological direction from the precedent is more likely to treat the
precedent negatively; in most of these cases, the panel opinion will
distinguish the precedent to reach the opposite outcome. The ideology of
the citing and precedent panels was important to the extent that it affected
the direction of case outcomes but did not explain the observed variation
in negative treatment on its own.
Furthermore, negative treatment is more likely to occur in opinions
designated for publication than in unpublished opinions. This too suggests
91 See 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(5).
92

It is possible, of course, that the judges on other courts of appeals behave

differently with respect to their circuits' precedents. This Article's focus on one
circuit limits my ability to speak to how the judges on these other courts behave.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 92

that circuit rules and norms constrain circuit judge decision making,
especially when one considers that publication is more likely in liberal
(procriminal defendant, procivil rights plaintiff) decisions even when
conservative judges make up the majority of the hearing panel.
This study suggests several possible avenues for additional research.
It would be interesting, for example, to examine only "harsher" forms of
negative treatment of circuit precedent, especially those cases in which
panel majorities effectively overrule circuit precedent, to determine ifthose
instances of negative treatment can be explained by judicial attitudes and
ideology. Such alterations of precedent are not likely to be explained in the
panel opinion with the factual distinctions referenced when a precedent is
merely distinguished. Under what circumstances, and how often, do hearing
panels overrule their own precedents, without recourse to the en banc
procedure?
Scholarship could also be conducted on whether the precedents
receiving negative treatment are raised by the parties in their briefs and oral
arguments, or whether hearing panels seek out circuit precedents to
distinguish or even to undermine. Based on the distinguishing treatments
included in the sample, it appears that the typical distinguishing treatment
is less a matter of a policy-oriented panel majority attempting to undermine
precedents with which it disagrees and more a matter of the opinion author
attempting to explain to one party or the other why the precedent that it has
cited in support of its position is inapposite. Further research might show
that negative treatment is better understood as the result of the dialogue
between the appellate panel and counsel, a dialogue largely about the
meaning and applicability of circuit precedents. Such a finding would
provide additional support for the view, advanced in this Article, that one
cannot understand the behavior of circuit judges without accounting for
legal variables, especially circuit precedent.

